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Abstract
False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person’s beliefs and
appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking.
We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous mea-
sure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing
their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-
specific memory, our results showed similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the pre-
school years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a small reduction
in this ability from younger to older adulthood. These results highlight the relative similarity in
false-belief reasoning abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan.
Introduction
Successful perspective taking requires the ability to represent and reason about another’s
beliefs and feelings. Central to social cognition and behavior across development, perspective
taking relates to variability in outcomes such as academic achievement and socio-emotional
adjustment [1–3]. Thus, understanding how perspective taking differs across ages is important.
The current study focuses on one type of perspective taking: false-belief reasoning, defined as
the ability to reason about another person’s beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from
reality. False-belief reasoning is a central component of theory of mind (ToM) [4]. While past
research with children has revealed a significant shift in the ability to appreciate false beliefs
during the preschool years, less is known about differences in false-belief reasoning from pre-
school to old age [5, 6].
There are two main obstacles to studying false-belief reasoning across the lifespan. First,
most false-belief reasoning tasks require categorical responses, which may produce floor and
ceiling effects. This obstacle can make continuous and quantitative differences appear categori-
cal and qualitative. For example, in the classic ToM “change-of-location” task that measures
false-belief reasoning, children hear a story involving Sally and Ann playing with a ball. Sally
places the ball in a box and leaves the room. While Sally is away, Ann moves the ball to a cup-
board. When Sally returns to the room, children must indicate where Sally will look for the
ball (false-belief question) and where Sally put the ball before she left (memory-control
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question). Because there are only two response options to each of these questions, researchers
then interpret performance on this task as all-or-none: The child either understands the con-
cept of false-belief reasoning or doesn’t [7]. This task cannot be used with adolescents and
adults because their performance tends to be at the task ceiling; however, much evidence
regarding adult false-belief performance derives from tasks that categorize information-rich
responses in a similarly reductionist fashion [8]. One way in which developmental psycholo-
gists have addressed the problem of using categorical tasks to measure false-belief reasoning is
by combining performance across a battery of age-appropriate categorical tasks to yield a con-
tinuous measure of performance [9].
The second obstacle to studying false-belief reasoning across the lifespan is that, although indi-
vidual differences in memory, language and executive function correlate with false-belief reason-
ing, in some studies age differences in these cognitive processes have failed to capture important
individual differences in false-belief reasoning [10]. For example, researchers have shown signifi-
cant associations between false-belief performance and separate tasks measuring episodic memory
[11]. The correlation between memory and false-belief reasoning (based on separate measures)
tells us that memory (as a general cognitive ability) is an important component of false-belief rea-
soning [12]; however, this correlation may not capture task-specific memory processes that one
needs to perform false-belief reasoning tasks (see [13, 14]). We maintain that these task-specific
processes may contribute additional age variance to false-belief performance that we would miss
by correlating performance on a separate memory task with a false-belief reasoning task. Indeed,
memory for task-specific information relies on many factors, such as participants’ motivation to
recall the task information and/or to recall social information more broadly.
To address these obstacles, we need (1) continuous tasks to assess false-belief reasoning,
and (2) to measure participants’ memory for information presented in the task itself to control
for variance due to task-specific memory. Researchers have created a continuous false-belief
task modeled on the classic change-of-location task, the Sandbox task [15]. Instead of using
two discrete response options, the experimenters hid an object inside a large container while
both characters were present, and then moved the object within the same container while the
protagonist was away. When asked to predict where the protagonist would search for the hid-
den object upon her return (false belief) or where the protagonist initially placed the object
(memory control), participants could indicate any location in the container. This task has
demonstrated utility in documenting age differences in false-belief reasoning. Preschoolers
and college students had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge to reason about another
person’s false belief, but performance improved with age [15]. In follow-up work, middle-aged
and older adults showed more difficulty with false-belief reasoning than did younger adults
[16]. These results suggest that false-belief reasoning undergoes periods of gains and losses
throughout the lifespan. The dynamic nature of false-belief reasoning is further supported by
adult research showing that older adults routinely make more errors than younger adults on
other tasks measuring false-belief reasoning [10].
We present the first study to examine differences in false-belief reasoning across a wide age
span: throughout the preschool years, from older childhood to younger adulthood, and from
younger to older adulthood. To accomplish this goal, we used a single continuous measure
that controlled for participants’ ability to remember task-specific information.
Materials and methods
Participants
This study received Research Ethics Board approval from Kwantlen Polytechnic University
and Simon Fraser University. Adult participants and parents of child participants provided
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written informed consent. Children provided oral assent. Participants were 266 individuals
ranging from 3 to 92 years, and comprising five age groups: twenty-three 3-year olds
(M = 41.00 months, SD = 4.16; 15 female), twenty 5-year olds (M = 62.30 months, SD = 2.81;
16 female), forty-one 9- to 12-year olds (M = 10.51, SD = 1.16, 23 female), one hundred and
twelve 17- to 25-year olds (M = 19.2 years, SD = 1.76, 81 female, 4 missing gender informa-
tion), and seventy 65- to 92-year olds (M = 72.8 years, SD = 5.66, 42 female).
This study was based in part on existing data; therefore, sample sizes varied across age
groups: The 3- and 5-year olds’ data are from ([15]: Experiment 2). The remaining data are
unpublished; however, some of the data and Methods are described elsewhere [17]. The 3- and
5-year olds came from a university-maintained child database. The 9- to 12-year olds came
from elementary and middle schools. The younger adults were university students. The older
adults were a healthy, community-dwelling sample screened for cognitive impairment (see
[17] for description of older and younger adult samples and recruitment). All participants
were fluent English speakers. (data are available for download in S1 Data; see S1 Text).
We note that not all ages within the 3–92 year age range are represented. The rationale for
assessing false-belief reasoning at specific points along the lifespan, aside from convenience, was
based on prior work. Specifically, we included the two preschool age groups based on work
showing classic gains in false-belief reasoning between 3- and 5-year olds. We included the 9- to
12-year olds based on work showing surprisingly late specificity in right temporal-parietal junc-
tion associated with false-belief reasoning that roughly corresponds to these adolescent ages
[18]. Finally, we included our adult samples based on work showing systematic decline in false-
belief reasoning and other theory of mind measures from younger to older adulthood [10].
Materials
The Sandbox task followed that of Sommerville et al. ([15]: Experiment 2), and involved a rect-
angular Styrofoam-filled box 60 inches long by 18 inches wide by 12 inches deep. The experi-
menter enacted nine stories, one per trial, each involving two characters and a hidden object.
The physical Sandbox represented different things in each story (e.g., sandbox, bathtub, planter
box). In eight of the stories (four false-belief trials, four memory-control trials), a protagonist
placed a small object in the Sandbox at one location (L1) and exited the scene. While the protag-
onist was away (false-belief and memory-control trials), a second character moved the object to
another location (L2) within the Sandbox. Participants received one critical question at the end
of each trial: False-belief trials required participants to take the perspective of the protagonist,
who had a false belief about the object’s location; memory-control trials required participants to
remember the object’s initial location. In one story (true-belief trial), the protagonist watched as
the other character moved the object. The purpose of this trial was to prevent participants from
realizing that the correct response on every trial was L1 (true belief correct response was L2).
Relative to the two other conditions, all age groups showed significantly more bias toward L2
on the true-belief trial. We do not consider the true-belief trial further.
As in [15], participants completed a 20-second visual search filler task prior to receiving the
critical question. For false-belief and memory-control trials, we varied whether L2 was to the
right or left of L1. The distance between L1 and L2 was 14 inches on all trials, and L1 and L2
occupied different locations throughout the Sandbox container across trials. Props were used
to represent the hidden object on each trial; story characters were not represented by props.
Procedure
Each participant completed nine trials within 10 minutes. For example, in one false-belief trial,
the experimenter read the first part of the story to the participant: Sally and Ann are outside
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playing in the sandbox. Sally hides a red toy dog in the sand here (experimenter hides dog at L1)
and then goes inside to get a drink of water. While Sally is inside the house, Ann finds the toy dog
and hides it here (experimenter moves dog to L2). Then the participant completed the visual-
search filler task (Where’s Waldo). After 20 seconds the experimenter read the critical question:
When Sally comes back, where will she look for her red toy dog? The experimenter instructed
participants to respond by pointing to a particular place in the Sandbox. If participants failed
to point to a particular place, the experimenter prompted them to do so.
We used the same procedures for the memory-control trials; however, when the protagonist
returned, the participant was asked to report the object’s initial hiding location. For example,
the corresponding memory-control question for the above story read, Then Sally comes back.
Where did she put her red toy dog before she went inside? As in the false-belief trial, the correct
response was L1. The false-belief and memory-control trials were methodologically identical
save the critical question. Additionally, at a conceptual level, both trial types required partici-
pants to report the same information; however, the false-belief and memory-control trials
required participants to access that information differently: While the false-belief questions
required participants to suppress their own knowledge of L2 to respond from the naïve protag-
onist’s perspective, the memory-control questions only required participants to remember
where the protagonist initially placed the object. Thus, memory-control bias arises from a fail-
ure to remember L1, whereas false-belief bias arises from a failure to suppress one’s own knowl-
edge and/or a failure to remember L1. Comparing the magnitude of memory-control bias to
false-belief bias can reveal the extent to which these two errors account for errors in false-belief
reasoning.
Statistical analyses
We calculated bias scores as the distance in inches between L1 and the participant’s response.
Bias scores approaching zero indicated that search estimates were randomly distributed
around L1, where the protagonist believed the object to be (i.e., no bias on false-belief trials;
accurate recall of L1 on memory-control trials). Conversely, responses in the direction of L2
indicated that the participant’s response was biased away from where the protagonist believed
the object to be, toward the actual object location (i.e., bias on false-belief trials; interference
from L2 on memory-control trials). Bias scores on the individual trials could fall anywhere
within the Sandbox; in practice, these scores mostly occupied L1, L2, and the space between L1
and L2 (Middle responses; Table 1).
Ideally, we would have liked to maintain our original age groups (3-year olds, 5-year olds,
9- to 12-year olds, 18- to 25-year olds, and 65- to 92-year olds) to explore age variation in false-
belief reasoning. However, methodological differences across samples prevented us from
doing so. Specifically, because we collected our data at different times and institutions, the
order in which we administered the false-belief and memory-control trials differed across sam-
ples (Table 2). Thus, comparisons of false-belief reasoning across some of the age groups were
confounded by trial order (e.g., receiving the memory-control trials prior to the false-belief tri-
als or vice versa).
To solve this problem, we categorized the data according to trial order rather than age. This
meant that we grouped participants who received the same trial order. We analyzed age as a
continuous variable within these groups. This resulted in the data being divided into the follow-
ing three groups, each of which we analyzed separately: (1) 3- and 5-year olds who received
Trial Order 1, (2) 9- to 12-year olds and 44 younger adults who received Trial Order 2, and (3)
the remaining 68 younger adults and the older adults who received Trial Order 3. This approach
allowed us to assess changes in false-belief reasoning across the preschool years, from older
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childhood to younger adulthood, and from younger adulthood to older adulthood, respectively.
However, we were unable to assess potential changes in false-belief reasoning across groups
(e.g., changes from the preschool years to older childhood).
We first completed descriptive analyses using our original categorization of age to identify
the pattern of false-belief reasoning at various developmental periods. Given that prior work
has demonstrated false-belief reasoning gains across the preschool years, we completed our
descriptive analyses with the 3- and 5-year-old data separated. Note that trial order was coun-
terbalanced within the preschool-aged children, thus, comparisons are not confounded by trial
order. In the first set of analyses, we calculated the percentages of individual trial responses
occupying L1, the Middle, and L2 in the Sandbox task (Table 1). We defined L1, Middle, and
L2 responses as follows: Based on a 5% cutoff value, where 5% of the total length of the Sand-
box = 3 inches, values falling within 3 inches on either side of L1 and L2 occupy L1 and L2,
respectively. Middle responses were locations falling more than 3 inches (more than 5% of the
Sandbox’s total length) away from L1 toward L2 and more than 3 inches away from L2 toward
L1. The second analysis involved calculating the average bias scores separately on the four
Table 2. Trial order across age groups.
Age Group Trial Order
Number
Trial Order Condition
3- and 5-year olds 1 FB (MC), FB (MC), FB (MC), FB (MC), TB, MC
(FB), MC (FB), MC (FB), MC (FB)
9- to 12-year olds, and forty-four 17-
to 25-year olds
2 MC, MC, FB, FB, TB, FB, FB, MC, MC
Sixty-eight 17- to 25-year olds and
the 65- to 92- year olds
3 MC, MC, FB, FB, TB, MC, MC, FB, FB
Note. FB = False Belief; MC = Memory Control; TB = True Belief. The parentheses in the 3- and 5-year olds
trial order reflect a counterbalanced design in which the participants either received the first four trials as
false-belief trials and the last four as memory-control trials or the first four trials as memory-control trials and
the last four as false-belief trials.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185345.t002
Table 1. Raw (percentage) response category frequencies across condition and age group.
Condition and Age Group L1 Middle L2
Memory Control
3 yrs 17 (18.4%) 26 (28.3%) 49 (53.3%)
5 yrs 24 (30%) 12 (15%) 44 (55%)
9–12 yrs 139 (84.7%) 17 (10.4%) 8 (4.9%)
18–25 yrs 361 (80.6%) 53 (11.8%) 34 (7.6%)
65–92 yrs 197 (70.4%) 42 (15.0%) 41 (14.6%)
False Belief
3 yrs 12 (13.1%) 20 (21.7%) 60 (65.2%)
5 yrs 20 (25%) 7 (8.7%) 53 (66.3%)
9–12 yrs 126 (76.8%) 11 (6.7%) 27 (16.5%)
18–25 yrs 299 (66.7%) 87 (19.4%) 62 (13.8%)
65–92 yrs 154 (55%) 51 (18.2%) 75 (26.8%)
Note. Response category frequencies are based on a 5% cutoff value, where 5% of the total length of the
Sandbox = 3 inches. Values falling within 3 inches on either side of L1 (correct response) and L2 (incorrect
response) fall into L1 and L2, respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185345.t001
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false-belief and four memory-control trials (Table 3). Because averaging data can obscure
important details not apparent at the individual-trial level, we included the first of these analy-
ses to show that participants of all age groups treated the Sandbox continuously rather than
categorically (e.g., they chose to respond somewhere in the middle of L1 and L2 on up to 20%
of 186 trials). We included the second analysis to depict the breakdown of false-belief and
memory-control responses within each age group. Note that with exception to the 3- and
5-year olds, comparison of mean biases across age groups should not be made due to the previ-
ously described trial-order confound.
Next, for each participant, we calculated a difference score (henceforth “egocentric bias,” our
inverse measure of false-belief reasoning: The higher one’s egocentric bias, the lower one’s false-
belief reasoning) by subtracting the average memory-control bias from the average false-belief
bias (Table 3). A positive egocentric bias (false-belief bias>memory-control bias) indicated dif-
ficulty suppressing one’s own knowledge to reason about another person’s false beliefs. We also
considered a multiplicative measure of egocentric bias wherein we divided false-belief bias by
memory-control bias; however, we believe that a difference score is a better measure of egocen-
tric bias and by extension, false-belief reasoning, than is a ratio score. Our primary rationale is
that we aimed to measure false-belief reasoning based on how much more often participants
made errors in the false-belief condition relative to the memory-control condition.
To assess age variation in false-belief reasoning, we conducted a series of regression analyses
assessing changes in egocentric bias across participants that received the same trial order.
Thus, our three regression analyses contained age as the independent variable and egocentric
bias as the dependent variable. The first regression assessed age variation in egocentric bias
across the preschool years (ages 3 and 5); the second regression assessed age variation in ego-
centric bias from older childhood to younger adulthood (9- to 12-year olds and forty-four of
the 18- to 25-year olds); the final regression assessed age variation in egocentric bias from
younger to older adulthood (sixty-eight of the 18- to 25-year olds and the 65- to 92-year olds).
We conducted power analyses for each of our regression analyses with an alpha level of .05 and
1 predictor [19]). We adopted Cohen’s f2 as a measure of relative effect size ([20]; small effect .02 to
.14; medium effect .15 to .34, and large effect .35). With N = 43, the regression analysis based on
the preschool sample had sufficient power (.90) to detect a medium effect (f2 = .25). With N = 85,
the regression analysis based on the older children and younger adult sample had sufficient power
(.82) to detect a small effect (f2 = .10). Finally, with N = 138, the regression analysis based on the
younger and older adult sample had sufficient power (.96) to detect a small effect (f2 = .10).
Results
Table 1 reports the percentages of responses occupying L1, the Middle, and L2 in the Sandbox task.
At a descriptive level, there are two notable features of these data: (1) There were fewer L1 responses
Table 3. Average false-belief bias, memory-control bias, and egocentric bias on the Sandbox task as
a function of age group.
Age Group M False-Belief Bias
[95% CI]
M Memory-Control Bias [95% CI] M Egocentric Bias
[95% CI]
3 12.45 [11.33, 13.56] 9.98 [8.86, 11.10] 2.47 [0.57, 4.36]
5 10.69 [8.54, 12.84] 8.90 [6.74, 11.05] 1.79 [-1.22, 4.82]
9–12 1.36 [0.17, 2.55] -0.44 [-1.00, 0.13] 1.80 [0.52, 3.07]
18–25 1.72 [1.00, 2.44] 0.32 [-0.40, 1.03] 1.40 [0.74, 2.06]
65–92 4.49 [3.50, 5.48] 1.97 [1.34, 2.60] 2.52 [1.52, 3.52]
M egocentric bias = false-belief bias minus memory-control bias. Higher scores indicate more bias.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185345.t003
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(correct responses) in the false-belief condition than in the memory-control condition; (2) There
were more Middle and L2 responses (incorrect responses) in the false-belief condition than in the
memory-control condition.
Table 3 depicts average false-belief bias, memory-control bias, and egocentric bias as a func-
tion of age group. Importantly, and as predicted, all age groups showed more bias in false-
belief than the memory-control trials, indicating that participants had more trouble suppress-
ing their own knowledge than they did remembering the object’s initial hiding location.
Table 4 includes the results of our multiple regression analysis. Despite the small difference
in mean bias scores across the preschool years (refer to Table 3), age was not a significant pre-
dictor of egocentric bias in the preschool-aged regression analysis, F(1, 41) = 0.13, p = .72, f2 =
.003. Moreover, age was not a significant predictor of egocentric bias in the older children and
younger adult regression analysis, F(1, 83) = 0.72, p = .40, f2 = .009. Conversely, age explained
8% of the variance in egocentric bias in the younger and older adult regression analysis, F(1,
136) = 11.15, p = .001, f2 = .08. Taken together, our analyses revealed similar egocentric bias
across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a
small but significant difference from younger to older adulthood. The latter difference revealed
that older adults showed more egocentric bias (i.e., poorer false-belief reasoning) than did
younger adults.
Given that difference scores can be misleading when there are large group differences in the
baseline scores that comprise the difference variable [21, 22], we completed three additional
regression analyses with false-belief bias as the dependent variable and memory-control bias as
an independent variable in Block 1 and age as an independent variable in Block 2. The results
from our primary regression analyses held, indicating that our findings were robust to differ-
ent methods of assessing false-belief reasoning.
Discussion
We present the first study to use a single measure to assess differences in false-belief reasoning
at various developmental periods across the lifespan. Using the Sandbox task, a continuous
change-of-location task with multiple trials that controls for task-specific memory, we derived a
measure of egocentric bias. We operationalized false-belief reasoning as the inverse of egocen-
tric bias, where higher scores denote poorer false-belief reasoning. We observed similar false-
belief reasoning across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood.
The only significant age difference that we observed was from younger to older adulthood.
Table 4. Simple regression analyses regressing egocentric bias on age.
Group/Predictor α β p-value R2
Preschoolers (N = 43) 3.39 .003
Age -0.32 .72
Older Children and Younger Adults (N = 85) 0.79 .009
Age 0.10 .40
Younger and Older Adults (N = 138) -0.22 .08*
Age 0.04 .001
Note. Preschoolers completed Trial Order 1. Older children and 44 younger adults completed Trial Order 2.
Sixty-eight younger adults and older adults completed Trial Order 3. The dependent measure was
egocentric bias (false-belief bias–memory-control bias) with higher scores indicating poorer false-belief
reasoning.
*p = .001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185345.t004
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Here, older adults exhibited more egocentric bias (i.e., poorer false-belief reasoning) than did
younger adults, replicating prior work [16].
Previous studies have shown large improvements in false-belief reasoning over the pre-
school years, small improvements in older childhood and younger adulthood, followed by
modest declines in older adulthood [6, 23, 24, 25]. Unlike the relative similarity in false-belief
reasoning ability that we observed at various points across the lifespan, separate meta-analytic
work in preschoolers and in adults have yielded large effects in 3- versus 5-year olds [6] and
medium effects in younger versus older adults [10].
One explanation for the discrepant findings is that the field uses different tasks to study
false-belief reasoning in different age groups. Most of these tasks measure what is called first-
order false-belief reasoning—understanding what one person thinks (used predominantly in
preschoolers) or what is called second-order false-belief reasoning—understanding what one
person thinks that another person thinks (used predominantly in younger versus older adults).
Moreover, many of these tasks involve dichotomous methods of assessing false-belief reason-
ing that fail to control for task-specific memory [26]. Conversely, our task involves a continu-
ous method that specifically controls for task-specific memory. Unlike the single-trial classic
change-of-location task, the Sandbox task can detect continuous differences in children’s and
adults’ tendency to favor beliefs over reality as determinants of others’ actions [27].
The Sandbox task also can detect continuous differences in people’s ability to suppress their
own knowledge when faced with conflicting perspectives [28]. For example, when analyzing
performance on the classic task, researchers often omit children who cannot recall the object’s
initial location (memory-control question). Performance, therefore, reflects a categorical mea-
sure of false-belief reasoning on a single trial after correcting for accurate memory (with the
untested assumption that children who answer the control question correctly did not guess).
In the Sandbox task, we administer multiple trials and retain all participants, but strictly con-
trol for their memory for the initial object locations. Thus, we conceptualize performance on
the Sandbox task to reflect continuous false-belief reasoning after correcting for task-specific
memory. Comparing these tasks, we argue that the classic task may inflate age differences:
Consider a 3-year old failing the change-of-location task and a 4-year old passing the task,
implying a categorical change in false-belief reasoning between the 3- and 4-year old. Con-
versely, our findings reveal no development in preschoolers’ false-belief reasoning, once we
control for task-specific memory. Thus, the discrepancy between prior results and our results
is potentially due to prior studies using tasks that fail to control for, assess (and verify) task-
specific memory. Perhaps the Sandbox task’s greatest strength is that it can be used to measure
variability in false-belief reasoning from preschool to old age.
The nature of classic false-belief tasks reflects the field’s original assumption that false-belief
reasoning is categorical: One either understands false belief or doesn’t. Many in the field have
shifted their focus to individual differences in false-belief reasoning. To study individual differ-
ences, researchers often combine performance across a battery of tasks. These combined scores
transform categorical measures into a continuous composite measure. Like many develop-
mental and cognitive psychologists, we conceive of false-belief reasoning as a continuous con-
struct. The Sandbox task measures the continuous nature of false-belief reasoning, which is an
important component of broader ToM and perspective-taking abilities. Our findings align
with recent literature documenting clear age differences in various ToM skills, including false-
belief reasoning, between younger and older adulthood [10, 29]. Further we provide support-
ing evidence for using a continuous measure of false belief to assist with delineating how and
when these age differences occur and what factors may influence variability in false-belief rea-
soning across ages.
False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age
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Aside from multiple trials and the capacity to measure a very wide age range, the
Sandbox task has additional advantages over classic false-belief tasks. The Sandbox task can
measure both categorical and continuous responses. For example, participants whose false-
belief and memory-control bias scores approach the outer limits of the Sandbox task would
correspond to participants who pass (zero inches) or fail (14 inches) standard categorical false-
belief tasks. This is because bias scores near zero reflect L1 responses, the correct response in a
two-location false-belief task. Bias scores near 14 inches reflect L2 responses, the incorrect
response in a two-location false-belief task. What then do we make of bias scores that fall
somewhere between zero and 14 inches, in the middle of L1 and L2? It is these middle scores
that reflect the continuous nature of false-belief reasoning—the extent to which one can repre-
sent false belief. As Table 1 shows, all age groups utilized the middle of the Sandbox.
It is important to address how task demands cause continuous variation across age in the
ability to demonstrate false-belief reasoning. Primary among these demands is the need to
remember L1 while ignoring the highly salient and recent L2. This enables one to reason that
the protagonist in the story has a false belief about where the object is located. The cognitive
processes underlying these demands may be task-specific memory (for L1) and inhibitory con-
trol (ignoring L2 to reason about the protagonist’s false belief). We know that memory and
inhibitory control improve from preschool to younger adulthood, followed by declines in
older adulthood [30, 31, 32]. We also know that inhibitory control relates to false-belief reason-
ing in children and adults [33, 34]). Table 1 reveals a qualitative difference between preschool-
ers and older adults in our study: Preschoolers’ responses are distributed around L2 whereas
older adults’ responses are distributed around L1 and the middle space between L1 and L2 in
the Sandbox task. From these data, we gather that preschoolers have more trouble inhibiting
their knowledge of L2 and are more prone to interference than are older adults [35].
Essentially, the Sandbox task, much like the classic change-of-location task, is a retroactive
interference paradigm in which recent information (L2) interferes with one’s ability to remem-
ber older information (L1) [36]. The memory-control question allows us to control specifically
for retroactive interference. The false-belief question, in addition to tapping retroactive inter-
ference, requires the extra processing step of ignoring what one knows (e.g., that Anne has
moved the ball to Location 2 while Sally was away) to reason from a naïve perspective (e.g.,
that Sally has a false belief about where the ball is). Therefore, the false-belief question in the
Sandbox task measures whether one can represent false belief (reflected by L1 or L2 responses),
and to what extent one can represent false belief (reflected by middle responses).
Considering these points, we maintain that successfully reasoning about another person’s
false belief requires the ability to (1) represent the others’ belief (which presumably children
aged 4 and older, younger adults and older adults possess; younger children and infants might
possess this ability too [25]), and (2) successfully represent another person’s belief state while
inhibiting one’s own belief state in a given situation. Healthy older adults do not lose the ability
to represent another person’s beliefs; rather, they show poorer ability to represent another per-
son’s beliefs while suppressing their own beliefs [24]. However, this process cannot simply be
due to a lack of memory for basic task information, or the need to coordinate two different
pieces of information (otherwise participants would have equivalent difficulty on the false-
belief and memory-control questions). Rather, there seems to be something specifically diffi-
cult about the demands of simultaneously representing someone else’s perspective while sup-
pressing one’s own.
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Limitations
The Sandbox task involves first-order false–belief reasoning. Thus, the results reported here
may not generalize to more complex second- and higher-order tasks used to assess ToM in
older children and adults, such as double bluff, faux pas, and moral judgments. Also, the current
study did not assess the validity of the Sandbox task. Other work has reported significant corre-
lations between false-belief bias in the Sandbox task and the classic change-of-location task after
controlling for memory-control bias and age in preschoolers and young children [15, 37];
though inter-test correlations for ToM tasks, more generally and especially among adults, are
quite low [29]. Future work might include additional age-appropriate ToM tasks of varying
complexities to assess the Sandbox task’s validity as a measure of false-belief reasoning in differ-
ent age groups. Other limitations to our study are that sample sizes and trial orders differed
between age groups. Future work should address these limitations by obtaining large samples,
assessing false-belief reasoning in different developmental periods both cross-sectionally and
longitudinally, and ensuring that all participants complete the Sandbox task in the same way.
This would enable more direct and continuous age comparisons across the lifespan. Future
work might also explore links between false-belief reasoning and cognitive processes by includ-
ing measures of language and executive function, such as inhibitory control and working mem-
ory. Finally, future work could employ formal mathematical models of the data to determine
the cognitive processes associated with false-belief reasoning across the lifespan [38–40].
Conclusions
Our results show similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the preschool years and from
older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by small differences in these abilities between
younger and older adults. These results highlight the relative similarity in false-belief reasoning
abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan. What our methodology and
results show is that the ability to reason about someone else’s naïve mental state while ignoring
one’s own knowledge (false-belief reasoning) shows only modest age-related differences across
the lifespan.
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